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This short research note is intended to stimulate debates across disciplinary and 
methodological-traditional boundaries. Such debates, we believe, are necessary for 
several reasons, of which two can be highlighted: One, exploring compatibilities and 
synergies across and beyond the layers of disciplinary structure that determine 
academic work is at the heart of scientific practice: it is the search for innovation and 
optimization of research tools and insights. Two, such exercises are always, 
perpetually, needed because our objects of research refuse to sit still. As scholars of 
humans in society and culture, our research instruments demand perpetual reality 
checking, because humans in society and culture are unpleasant enough to change 
perpetually, and methods for understanding social and cultural processes that were 
adequate yesterday are not guaranteed to be adequate tomorrow.  
 
Certainly in an age of globalization, superdiversity, and complex online-offline 
dynamics in social and cultural life, several major adjustments are required to a 
scholarly apparatus rather more at ease with clear-cut categories, linear processes and 
transparent propositional meanings. This contemporary world is characterized by very 
rapid social change, some of it superficial but other aspects of it fundamental. Such 
changes occur across the total specter of human activity, collective as well as 
individual: they involve intense demographic changes; changes in the economic 
structures of society; in social structures of community, belonging, power and 
entitlement; in political structures responding to these other changes; to cognitive, 
psychological and identity changes; to linguistic and semiotic changes; to changes in 
the relationships between urban and rural areas, regions, nation-states and larger 
geopolitical units in the world. Such changes were anticipated almost two decades ago 
by e.g. Castells (1996) and Appadurai (1996). But it is now that the full scope, scale 
and weight of these changes become apparent and inescapable 
 
These rapid processes of change defy the synchronic, sedentary, linear and static bias 
of sciences based on structuralist assumptions about the social and cultural world; 
they also challenge the structuralist assumption that generalizations need to be 
context-free abstractions; and they question the most fundamental presuppositions 
deployed in disciplines about how the world is and how humans fit into that. 
Complexity, mobility and dynamics are key defining features of the present world; 
they need to be converted into useful research instruments, and this job is far from 
being done at present. 
 
In what follows we will attempt to sketch a broad methodological platform on which 
two very different methodological frameworks will be joined: ethnography and 
survey research. It is part of the tradition we mentioned just now that many would see 
these two approaches as the extreme poles of a continuum of scientific methodology. 
The former one would be the archetypal ‘qualitative’ kind of research, focused on 
intersubjective small-scale interpretive work; the latter would be the archetypal 
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‘quantitative’ approach based on an analytical distancing of researcher and object, 
standardized procedures and statistical factual outcomes. The non-compatibility of 
both is often, and widely, taken for granted; and practitioners of both (this does not 
exclude the present authors) would often be seen as hardnosed methodological 
fundamentalists with severely limited patience for the arguments of the other side. 
While both of us are profoundly committed practitioners of our respective disciplines, 
we believe that this old ritual of mock hostility prevents certain interesting and 
creative things from happening on both sides; and we believe that exploring 
differences and similarities between these frameworks can be highly productive in 
light of the challenges described earlier: we share an object, and this object is 
changing fast; all of us, consequently, permanently risk getting out of touch with that 
object. 
 
The notion that we share an object is fundamental. It is the shared nature of the object 
that should make us realize that the views of that object from within our disciplines 
are necessarily partial. Different views represent different sides and features of the 
object, but it is the same object. And an object as complex as humans in society and 
culture surely tolerates multiple and very different views which, together, might 
perhaps bring us closer to a comprehensive picture.1 Interestingly, this exercise has 
precedents, and a lot of what we will say contains echoes of work done decades ago 
but largely neglected nowadays. 
 
The issue: what do we know? 
 
If social and cultural environments are marked by complexity, mobility and dynamics, 
it means that very little can be presupposed with respect to the features of such 
environments. We can believe that a ‘neighborhood’ hosts a sedentary population – 
the neighbors – only to discover that an important part of the population there is 
actually nomadic, using the neighborhood as a transit zone to other destinations (e.g. 
Blommaert 2013). We can believe that two refugees from Iraq share a significant 
amount of features, enough to treat them similarly, only to discover that one is a 
highly educated person who prepared his escape from Iraq in some detail and can rely 
on a support network in the diaspora, while the other person is the victim of brutal and 
exploitative human trafficking leaving her with no support whatsoever, and with a 
very different set of challenges from the first one. We can believe that a pupil is 
learning disabled because he cannot memorize the inflections of the French verb 
avoir, only to discover that that same pupil knows all the players of FC Barcelona by 
heart, as well as huge amounts of relevant data about them. We can believe that a 
‘friend’ on Facebook is a 14-year old girl, only to find out that this friend is a 28-year 
old man. 
 
Such problems of presuppositions not holding true confront a broad variety of actors, 









policy makers and – note – researchers. Superdiverse environments are best seen as 
complex systems in which several different forces generate crisscrossing, overlapping 
and conflicting processes, in which the statistical average or numerical majority is not 
the engine behind power and control, in which small ‘deviations’ or ‘exceptions’ – the 
‘error margin’ of large-scale research – often represent the onset of massive future 
change, and in which well known activities and characteristics may result in 
nonlinear, unexpected effects. Complex systems have stochastic characteristics: they 
move in directions of which the general vector can sometimes be identified, but of 
which the precise outcomes cannot be predicted (cf Prigogine & Stengers 1984; see 
Blommaert 2013 for a discussion). 
 
This generates problems. If a researcher cannot rely on accurate and robust baseline 
knowledge of the social and cultural environment s/he investigates, epistemological 
and methodological problems quickly occur at all levels. Designing a reliable 
population sample for survey research, for instance, is hard when the baseline 
knowledge of the population is questionable; research on social media usage in China, 
where due to strict internet policing very many users hide behind aliases and phony 
profiles, is a case in point (Wang et al, ftc.). If we don’t know how many ‘real’ people 
are there, whether these people are male or female, young or old, highly educated or 
not, and so on – how then can we construct a reliable and representative sample? We 
can always make a sample, surely, but what is that sample actually representative of? 
 
Informed readers have detected by now that the foregoing point leads us to a well-
known issue in social-scientific and humanities research: the problem of ecological 
validity in survey work. The problem was powerfully sketched and stated half a 
century ago by Aaron Cicourel (1964); a more recent and clear formulation by 
Cicourel is the following: 
 
“The ecological validity problem can be stated as follows: To what extent is 
the content of questions asked commensurate with the socially distributed 
knowledge possessed by the respondents? Do the questions asked address 
topics, beliefs, attitudes and opinions the respondents routinely discuss in 
everyday life during social interaction with others? Further, to what extent can 
we assume that given the absence of ethnographic information about different 
communities, we can ignore the extent to which the wording and content of 
the questions are comprehended similarly by the entire sample? Are the 
questions, therefore, different from or are they in correspondence or congruent 
with observing the way respondents express themselves in their daily life 
encounters with others?” (Cicourel et al 2004: 8) 
 
What Cicourel flags as a major issue here is that, when we abstain from involving 
ourselves in ethnographic research that establishes the specific universes of meaning 
and interpretation that individual people use in handling survey questions, we can 
only compensate that absence of ethnographically gathered knowledge by using a 
very large, and valid, range of presuppositions about the sharedness of such universes 
among our respondents. This can, perhaps, be reasonably feasible when we 
investigate groups of people of whom we know they share a lot of social and cultural 
material, and use this sharedness as our focus of investigation (think of small religious 
communities or soccer teams); it is however extremely hard to sustain when we 
engage in research involving very different groups of people. The more diverse the 
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populations we investigate, the lower our certainty about the characteristics of these 
populations. Simple-sounding terms such as “labor”, or “satisfied”, used in identical 
questions to a very diverse sample of respondents, may consequently be understood in 
ways so deeply different that it renders the outcomes effectively incommensurable. 
Pierre Bourdieu – a close friend and associate of Cicourel – made a similar point 
when he observed that opinion research presupposes the fact that everyone has an 
opinion on the topic of research, whereas for many respondents the confrontation with 
a survey question is actually the first time ever they are invited to think about a 
particular topic (Bourdieu 1972 [1994]). And both were undoubtedly inspired by 
Herbert Blumer’s remarks, made in 1947, that “current public opinion polling has not 
succeeded in isolating public opinion as a generic object of study” (Blumer 1947 
[2000]: 148). In other words: the ‘public’ qualification of opinions is not a priori an 
ecologically valid statement, for we do not know in advance whether the opinions we 
intend to describe are effectively present, shared, and generalizable as ‘public’ prior 
to our inquiry. We cannot presuppose this. What we can do, however, is to – first – 
establish ethnographically whether or not our object displays an adequate degree of 
social and cultural fit in the communities we shall investigate, and how this object is 
locally treated, thought about, discussed and/or acted upon by our respondents. 
 
We will shortly move to consider attempts at doing precisely this. At present, it 
suffices to observe that the rapid change we currently witness in society and culture 
raises the issue of ecological validity from the dead and brings it back with a 
vengeance. The complexity now characterizing social systems precludes quick 
assumptions about semantic and praxeological sharedness and stability among nearly 




Cicourel’s critique of ecological validity quickly zoomed in on the methodology of 
interviewing. Let us recall what he had to say on this issue: 
 
“The serious problem associated with self-contained interviews and surveys 
without ethnography is that we sample bodies but not their everyday 
behavioral environments. We lack systematic observation of respondents' 
daily life activities and the condition under which attitudes, opinions, beliefs, 
and folk knowledge emerge and are displayed. (…) 
 
Conducting interviews with closed- or fixed-choice questions or sending 
respondents questionnaires to fill out fixed-choice survey questions has often 
been an end in and of itself. There has been little or no interest in conducting 
systematic observation of the ecological settings in which respondents lived or 
played or worked, including their discourse practices. It is customary to 
interview a small sample of respondents before constructing a sample survey. 
The general idea was to explore questions in some detail before settling on a 
particular set of them for the larger survey. The small subset of a sample (the 
"pretest") was intended to satisfy validity issues, but respondents, even if 
interviewed at home, often answered questions with guarded enthusiasm. The 
quality of surveys, therefore, could be partially improved by using tape 
recorders. Random recordings would provide a sense of how the language 
used in the pretest oriented respondents to the study's goals and the extent to 
  5
which they resulted in modifications of the final questions employed. Tape 
recording a random subset of the final questionnaire sample could enable the 
research analyst to compare the way interviewers and respondents carried out 
the task.” (Cicourel et al 2004: 8-9) 
 
The problem, in its simplest form, is this: how can we be sure that the same question 
(containing the same lexicogrammatical and semantico-pragmatic pattern) has the 
same meaning for all the respondents we ask the question to? Cicourel himself, 
referring to the ‘paraphrase problem’, puts it as follows: “Is the format and content of 
a question commensurate with the way the information is organized in memory that 
would enable the respondent to answer?” (id.: 10). Cicourel’s answer is negative, 
unless we ethnographically investigate this question; and for that to happen, we need 
to pay specific attention to the interactional structure of the research interview. The 
seemingly routinized and uniform question-answer sequences performed by survey 
researchers with their respondents hide a potentially debilitating interpretational 
diversity – this point has been made above. 
 
But why? Cicourel formulated his concerns in the 1960s, more or less simultaneously 
to the birth and growth of sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology, to which he 
himself substantially contributed. And from within sociolinguistics and linguistic 
anthropology, the details of the problem of the research interview gradually became 
clear: human interaction turned out to be governed by what is now called 
‘indexicality’: delicate connections between talk and sociocultural context that are 
highly meaningful. The kind of meanings generated by indexicality broadly contain 
what is in more common parlance known as ‘connotation’: implicit but crucial 
structures of inference that are able to create entirely different meaning effects for the 
same lexicogrammatical and semantico-pragmatic patterns. Put simply: the same 
sentence can have an entirely different meaning uptake, depending on who, when, 
where and how it was formulated. Context is not just an influence and not just a 
dominant factor in the creation of meaning, it is a determining factor. The 
lexicogrammatical and semantico-pragmatic patterns in communication are directed 
by a metapragmatic pattern, which has its feet firmly in the sociocultural conditions – 
macro as well as micro and nano – under which such patterns are produced (see 
Hymes 1972; Gumperz 1982; Silverstein 1992, 2006; Rampton 1995; Blommaert 
2005a, 2006; Agha 2007; Rampton & Blommaert 2011). In Cicourel’s own 
formulation: 
 
“Indexical expressions imply either ambiguity or unstated elements of 
meaning. Their local comprehension, therefore, involves the interaction of 
prior or present compression of information. For example, phonology, syntax, 
semantics, pragmatics, prosody, mundane knowledge, and the perception of 
the social setting within which such expressions occur can all influence their 
meaning. Interview and survey questions invariably involve indexical 
expressions. The paraphrase problem, therefore, could include aspects of an 
expression's indexical properties. The notion of indexical expressions as used 
by ethnomethodologists assumes explicit reference to the respondent's local 
understanding of an expression, but to my knowledge does not refer explicitly 
to the organization of their memory of past experiences that might be relevant 
for understanding how a respondent might formulate or choose a fixed choice 
or open-ended answer to a question.” (ibid) 
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Cicourel’s student Charles Briggs synthesized and systematized the various issues 
raised by indexicality in research interviews in his classic Learning How to Ask 
(1986); still an indispensible book for anyone using interviews in research. Briggs’ 
caution, strongly emphasized also by Cicourel, was that attempts to bring context 
‘under control’ by, for instance, using white room environments for respondents, do 
not remove the problem because a white room is a context as much as any other 
context (quite an unnatural context as well), and various respondents can respond in 
very different ways to that context. Variability is not a function of the context itself, it 
is a function of how individuals interact with contexts. Using an identical context, 
thus, can lead to important insights in how individuals absorb and act upon such 
contexts; it does not however create a context in which meanings are no longer 
subject to variable indexical inferences.2 
 
Several decades of systematic work on indexicality have led to an awareness that 
communication – any communication – contains a level of interpretational uncertainty 
because the indexical orientations displayed in communication are, in principle, not a 
priori detectable. Suggestions as to interpretational stability derived from the 
observation that identical utterances produce identical propositional meanings are 
dismissed because utterances contain vastly more than just propositional meanings; 
and if these nonpropositional, indexical meaning effects are not taken into account, 
any suggestion about interpretational stability is an expression of the researchers’ 
wishful thinking but methodologically entirely unsustainable. Little firm belief can be 
given to research findings not based on this critical insight. 
 
This insight naturally has the potential of removing any possibility of investigating 
large collectives of respondents. Indeed, in sociolinguistics and related branches of 
science, it gave rise to a rich tradition of micro-analysis of uniquely situated 
utterances or stretches thereof; much of contemporary discourse analysis instantiates 
this approach (see Blommaert 2005a for a discussion). If meaning is uncertain even at 
the level of the individual utterance, how can it be certain at the level of groups? 
 
The answer to this, is indexical order (Silverstein 2003; Blommaert 2005a; Agha 
2007). Indexicals appear not to be randomly generated – indexicality, thus, is not the 
cause of chaos in meaning. They occur in forms of order: dynamic and highly 
changeable forms of order, yes, but always order. The reason for this is relatively 
simple: we can only produce meanings, ‘make sense’ of what people including 
ourselves say, when there is a degree of recognizability in the signs we use, and this 
recognizability rests on conventionalization and ordering of indexicals into relatively 
perduring fields and patterns we call ‘code’, ‘register’, ‘genre’, ‘intertextuality’, 
‘entextualization’ and so forth (see Agha 2007 for a survey).3 Such forms of indexical 
order explain the fact that widely divergent groups of speakers – for instance, a highly 
                                                        
2 We can add a second warning here, formulated by Hymes (1966). Hymes points out that 
people very often are able to explicitly reproduce only specific, and severely limited, amounts 
of cultural material. Consequently, asking is not the best way to find out what there is to be 
found out: observation is indispensible. 
3 The ‘ethnomethods’ of Garfinkelian and Goffmannian ethnomethodology, to which 
Cicourel importantly contributed, also looked for locally ordered forms of making sense in 
everyday behavior. Cicourel later distanced himself from ethnomethodology and conversation 
analysis on grounds that it neglected the cognitive and psychological aspects of everyday 
practices. 
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international group of academics at a conference, using wildly different varieties of 
English – can still understand each other quite well. While every instance of 
communication is entirely unique, it still requires a level of recognizability, and hence 
collective sharedness, to become real communication. Recent work has shown that 
even in highly unstable and rapidly changing sociolinguistic environments, ad-hoc 
norms – agreements on the recognizability of communicative signs – emerge 
continuously and operate effectively in what, at first sight, may appear as a chaotic 
language context. This process of rapid norm development is called ‘enregisterment’: 
people continuously create communicative orders, communicative norms, even in 
entirely unstable environments (e.g. Silverstein 2003; Agha 2007; Moller et al 2011; 
Creese & Blackledge 2010; Rampton 2006; Blommaert 2012). 
 
This means that there is a level of collectiveness to indexicals, that the ‘paraphrase 
problem’ can be brought, at least to some extent, under control, and that some degree 
of ecological validity may be achieved. It also means, however, that this can only 
happen if adequate investigation of such forms of order precedes the use of order as 
an assumption in research. Indexical order, in sum, cannot be taken as a given; one 
needs to go out and find out before it can be thus established. Ethnographic 
exploration of orders of indexicality are indispensible in any form of research that 
uses human interaction, in any form, in its research methods. 
 
Combining ethnography and statistics: Bourdieu 
 
Let us keep this in mind now, and turn to attempts to combine ethnography and 
survey work in coherent research designs. Let us also recall the fundamentally 
different orientation between both methodological traditions: Ethnography is 
concerned with validity and does not attempt to generalize over populations – it is not 
concerned with representativeness, in other words; statistical survey work is aimed 
exactly at representativeness and less at validity. When it comes to generalization, 
ethnography provides qualitative generalizations, i.e. theoretical hypotheses based on 
the systemic aspects of uniquely situated cases. Statistical approaches provide 
quantitative generalizations, i.e. calculated calibrations that speak to the entire 
population, respective to a theory. Both are valid forms of generalization – it is 
important to underscore this in a scientific universe in which increasingly only the 
second type of generalization looks respectable. A theoretical generalization is 
different in type from a qualitative generalization; the former is, as we know, 
dominated by the criteria of validity; the latter by criteria of representativeness. 
Misunderstandings over the notion of ‘theory’ tend to cause the confusion about 
generalizations: representativeness does not in itself constitute theory, it constitutes 
proof of theory. The line of production, so to speak, of theory itself is of a different 
order. Theory demands validity; its proof demands representativeness. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu surely had a very sharp understanding of this. A point rarely picked 
up by his critics and followers, but perennially underscored in his own work, is the 
ethnographic epistemology that underpinned his work (Reay 2004; Wacquant 2004; 
Blommaert 2005b). Crucial theoretical concepts from his work – think of Habitus, 
Logic of Practice, and Field – are ethnographically grounded. That is, they are 
heuristic (and thus generalizable) notions derived from intense intersubjective 
engagement with respondents in real social environments (what Bourdieu always 
termed as the meeting of different Habituses).  
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Yet, Bourdieu used extensive surveys as the backbone of some of his most impressive 
work. Distinction, for instance, presents its readers with the results of a large-scale 
series of survey studies in which aspects of ‘subjective’ experiences of class structure 
were investigated. This survey-driven study is announced by Bourdieu as “a sort of 
ethnography of France” (1986: xi). Such statements in Bourdieu’s work are not 
frivolous; they are fundamental methodological statements, and in order to understand 
this we need to listen to what he had to say about his general research approach. As 
said, he invariably started from ethnographic engagement in the field, where the 
confrontation of two socially grounded forms of embodied subjectivity (Habituses) 
provided the hypotheses to be statistically tested: 
 
 “It was no doubt because I found myself in a situation where I could directly 
observe the disarray or the distress of economic agents devoid of the 
dispositions tacitly demanded by an economic order that for us is entirely 
familiar – in which, being an embodied and therefore naturalized social 
structure, they appear as self-evident, necessary and universal – that I was able 
to conceive of the idea of statistically analyzing the conditions of possibility of 
these historically constituted dispositions”. (Bourdieu 2000: 18) 
 
Slightly further, he again specifies the connection between ethnography and statistical 
analysis: 
 
 “nothing had prepared me to understand the economy, especially my own, as a 
system of embodied beliefs, I had to learn, step by step, through ethnographic 
observation later corroborated by statistical analysis, the practical logic of the 
precapitalist economy, at the same time as I was trying as best as I could to 
figure out its grammar” (Id: 24) 
 
It is important at this point to understand that Bourdieu started his academic life as an 
anthropologist – a science then dominated in France by Claude Levi-Strauss’ version 
of structuralism. This structuralism, with its clear and abstract categorization patterns 
and lines of abstract generalization necessarily severing connections with experienced 
and empirical reality, clashed with Bourdieu’s ethnographic experiences, in which he 
found confusion, contradiction and tension rather than the harmony of Levi-Straussian 
‘ethnology’. Generalization (the ‘grammar’ mentioned in the quote above), for him, 
should be empirical, not abstract, and reflecting the on-the-ground realities detected in 
ethnography. And such generalizations would be built by statistical work entirely 
grounded in ethnographic observation – the questions would be ethnography-based – 
and framed in an ethnographic epistemology, that is: an awareness that outcomes of 
statistical generalization needed to be fed back to the empirical on-the-ground realities 
from which they emerged.  
 
This created a loop: ethnography-statistics-ethnography-statistics and so forth. And 
this loop explains the second major feature of Bourdieu’s approach: he would return 
throughout his career to the same field sites for ethnographic follow-up work. This 
move historicized his work: the loop in which ethnographic material was tested 
statistically and then brought into a new ethnographic round of inquiry removed the 
synchronic bias of Levi-Straussian structuralism and made Bourdieu’s object 
dynamic. His methodology, consequently, was one that addressed change rather than 
stasis. The acute historical awareness in Bourdieu’s work is the second point, along 
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with his ethnographic epistemology, that shines through in almost every major 
theoretical statement made by him. Consider his definition of Habitus (Bourdieu 
1990: 54): 
 
“the structures characterizing a determinate class of conditions of existence 
produce the structures of the habitus, which in their turn are the basis of the 
perception and appreciation of all subsequent experiences. The habitus, 
product of history, produces individual and collective practices – more history 
– in accordance with the schemes generated by history.” 
 
The ethnographic grounding of Bourdieu’s approach removed the ‘snapshot’ (i.e. 
synchronic) quality from survey methodology and replaced it with a dynamic and 
change-oriented one.4 Note that the dynamic theory, lodged in his central theoretical 
concepts, is generated by ethnography. Bourdieu moves from ethnographic 
generalization – his theory – to statistical generalization; the latter he qualifies as 
‘corroboration’: statistical analysis enables him to grant his theory not just validity but 
also representativeness. His level of generalization is no longer, like in Levi-Strauss’ 
‘ethnology’, grounded in universalist abstractions; it is an empirical (‘ethnographic’) 
generalization, and this enables him to call Distinction and its many statistical data an 
“ethnography of France”. 
 
Towards an applicable instrument 
 
Recall that Cicourel always insisted that he had nothing against statistics, and even 
found it a very important analytical tool, provided the statistics was applied to a field 
of which the validity had been tested. This validity resides in the commensurability of 
what is tested in surveys with what in local real conditions is experienced and 
articulated, how locally the world is constructed, so to speak. The solution offered by 
Bourdieu – a methodological loop in which ethnography and statistical survey work 
are continuously sequentially used to confirm or amend the findings – provides 
validity and enables representativeness. We thus get a two-pronged reality check, in 
which valid findings can be generalized towards representativeness, and in which this 
representativeness is in turn checked as to its validity in the field. The strengths and 
weaknesses of both approaches have now been blended into one approach, 
methodologically diverse but epistemologically unified, and tied together by a single 
object of which the various dimensions are recognized.5 
 
Using this model as a template for further development and using the benefit of a 
vastly more refined understanding of ordered indexicals enabling new and more 
reliable forms of interviewing and questioning, we can start thinking of a concrete 
research instrument targeted at investigations of processes of rapid social and cultural 
change. The uncertainty and complexity characterizing such processes demands an 
approach which  
                                                        
4 The ‘schemes’ mentioned by Bourdieu fit into the category of ‘genre’, ‘register’ etc. 
mentioned earlier. In fact, it is on the basis of such notions, all referring to the partly systemic 
(structured) nature of human conduct, that ethnographic generalizations are made. 
5 The preciseness of this formulation is essential and deviates from many descriptions of what 
is commonly called ‘mixed methods’. Methods are, in effect, not mixed but sequentially 
ordered; the epistemological direction is important, as well as the description of the object. 
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(a) invites and privileges longitudinal, or at least repeated inquiry;  
(b) necessitates a continuous reality check of any insight and finding 
(c) applied both to validity and representativeness, given the intensely 
dynamic nature of the object; 
(d) uses ethnographic findings as (realistically) ecologically situated and 
(hypothetically) systemically meaningful features of a social system 
(e) and statistical insights as pertaining to the scope and level of saturation of 
such features, thus credentialing the systemic nature of the findings. 
 
Such an approach could be useful to determine the vector of change in complex and 
dynamic social systems. To be more precise: the dialectic between locally grounded 
findings, their scope and level of saturation might begin to tell us something about the 
way in which social and cultural change starts, develops and culminates over time 
within a given population. We know that in stochastic systems, change can begin in 
what is usually seen as ‘exceptions’ and ‘deviations’. Such features are statistically 
insignificant; yet they can grow into the major transforming force in a system. 
Repeated statistical analysis can establish such patterns of developing change, 
elucidating its directions and scope, while repeated ethnographic inspection can 
establish the specific ways in which transformations in scope and level of saturation 
trigger qualitative changes in the feature.  
 
To give a trivial example: changes in popular-cultural, say musical, trends start 
outside or in the margins of the music industry. Few people will know the music and 
the artists, and those who know it might see it as a revolutionary innovation in the 
field of music. When this ‘new’ music becomes popular, however, the revolutionary 
and innovative character of it will rub off, as artists and their music become 
mainstream. The growth in (statistically verifiable) scope here goes hand in hand with 
an (ethnographically verifiable) change in the place of this music in social and 
cultural contexts, a change in what it means in real life. The totality of this 
phenomenon cannot be comprehended by using just one angle – we need both. 
 
This trivial example instantiates an elementary kind of social and cultural process, 
which is however occurring with astonishing speed and scope in contemporary 
societies; think of the explosive growth of online social media and gaming 
communities, the viral nature of seemingly innocuous memes on the internet, or the 
rapid demographic transitions in superdiverse neighborhoods. 
 
We are well underway to such an approach. In the last five years we have built up 
much experience in analyzing fairly unstructured interviews so as to discover the 
discourse (language registers) individuals from various ethnic groups in South Africa 
use to describe themselves and others. These studies have yielded significant insights 
by combining a high ecological validity with statistical procedures in the analysis. We 
are currently using diary methods, again in South Africa, to get better insight with 
whom actors in a diverse environment interact on a daily basis and what are the topics 
of their interaction with members of the various groups (e.g. Cheung et al 2011; 
Valchev et al. 2013). The analyses of these data will allow us to develop “identity 
landscapes”, which refer to the multiple identities people and highly diverse 
environments have and link these identities to their context of occurrence. Such 
studies can be easily extended to other environments, and combined with ‘deep’ 
ethnographies aimed at, for instance, linguistic landscape description. By repeating 
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such open-and questions across time periods, we will be able to unobtrusively gauge 
the shifting social context of immigrants and mainstream members. We will better 
understand whether they are differences in the groups with whom each interact. 
Understanding the open-ended answers of panel members requires much ethnographic 
knowledge of the respective groups. This knowledge is used in a close analysis of the 
responses, ethnographically described and analyzed using quantitative procedures 
(usually after tabulation and the use of statistical procedures for contingency tables). 
This combination of approaches has run smoothly in the teams we deployed until 
now. We can develop it further. 
 
One final remark is in order. The analytic instrument we have in mind obviously 
involves teamwork, in which teams combining different methodological angles are 
formed around specific unified research objects. While it would be good if such teams 
were composed of people equally skilled in all the techniques deployed in the team, 
academic realists such as the present authors realize that this is not possible. It may 
not even be necessary to train people fully in both approaches, for what is needed is a 
sensitivity for different approaches and how they arrive at insights. We do not per se 
need ethnographers who are entirely versed in advanced statistical analysis; we need 
(to paraphrase Hymes) ethnographers who can read and understand statistical 
analysis; vice versa with people trained in survey research. 6 
 
As mentioned earlier: the crucial operational point is to establish an object of research 
that can be recognized as relevant to both. It is the presence of a shared object that 
establishes the ‘indexical order’, so to speak, in such heterogeneous teams. While this 
is not difficult work, it is often left aside, and with disastrous effects on 
communicability of findings and analytical punch. Intrinsically shared objects are 
abundant out there. What is needed is to get them in, discuss the different aspects that 
make up the complex nature of the objects, and draw an approach aimed at 
disentangling that complexity. Rapid social and cultural change is perhaps the most 
crucial feature of the social environments in which all of us dwell, and the most 
urgent thing to decode, understand and get used to. Analytically, it creates challenges; 
but the challenge is not just a euphemism for ‘problem’: it is also an invitation to 
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6 This also counts for publishing. A frequently expressed anxiety is that work within ‘mixed 
methods’ creates problems in publishing; given the tremendous pressure to publish, and 
publish in monodisciplinary key journals, this anxiety is understandable. There is, however, 
no compelling reason why some of the outcomes of joint work could not be routed towards 
monodisciplinary outlets while others are targeted at different audiences. In addition, 
innovative work done in-between disciplines invariably has innovative effects on the core 
disciplines, which is why cross-over work often acquires theoretical significance and 
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